Critics Must Compare Present Trade Deals with Earlier Pacts

 Surveshwar Sarvesh Pathak

New Delhi : When Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi recently outlined in Parliament a hypothetical framework for how the INDIA alliance would negotiate a trade agreement with the United States, he framed it as an exercise in assured, balanced diplomacy. Yet serious engagement with Washington cannot proceed in abstraction. It must be measured against precedent — most notably the India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement.
For many critics, that agreement is more than a diplomatic milestone; it is a case study in how landmark negotiations can embed long-term structural consequences. Under the UPA government, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and to place its civilian program under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deal ended decades of nuclear isolation and opened access to global fuel and reactor markets. But detractors argue that it also formalized external oversight over a substantial segment of India’s nuclear infrastructure — in perpetuity.
The contrast drawn today is philosophical as much as political. Opponents describe the UPA’s approach as concession-driven diplomacy — accepting enduring constraints in exchange for international integration. The NDA, by contrast, has consistently articulated a doctrine of strategic autonomy, emphasizing resistance to agreements that institutionalize long-term limitations on sovereign decision-making. The debate, therefore, is not about personalities; it is about the underlying logic of negotiation: integration at a structural cost versus autonomy guarded by caution.
The non-proliferation commitments embedded in the 2008 accord illustrate this tension. All nuclear material and equipment transferred under its framework were required to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and remain under IAEA safeguards. This provision ensured that imported assets could never be diverted toward military applications, effectively narrowing India’s strategic flexibility for the foreseeable future.
Equally significant was the permanence of oversight. Once civilian facilities were placed under safeguards, the monitoring became irreversible. Even if diplomatic ties fray or supply assurances weaken, the safeguards remain intact. Critics argue that this establishes a durable layer of international supervision over a critical sector of national capability.
The civil–military separation further codified this shift. Once designated civilian, a facility could not revert to military use. The earlier strategic ambiguity — which allowed for greater operational flexibility — was replaced with a rigid demarcation. In doing so, long-term trade-offs were written into the architecture of the program.
On nuclear testing, India retained its formal sovereign right. Yet U.S. domestic laws associated with the agreement created automatic consequences: a future test could suspend cooperation and technology flows. It was not a legal prohibition, but it imposed material strategic and financial costs — enough to shape policy calculations at the highest level.
Fuel supply assurances, though prominently cited, are inherently exposed to geopolitical volatility. Diplomatic tensions or legislative shifts in Washington could disrupt supply chains, leaving imported reactors dependent on uncertain external support. Interdependence, critics caution, is never devoid of vulnerability.
The agreement also influenced technological direction. By opening the market to large imported light-water reactors, it redirected capital, policy focus, and expertise toward foreign vendors. In the process, momentum behind indigenous platforms such as pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) arguably slowed, raising broader questions about self-reliance and long-term industrial strategy.
Even advanced programs — including fast breeder reactors and thorium-cycle initiatives — though kept outside safeguards, came under sharper global scrutiny because of the clearer public demarcation between civilian and military streams. Transparency increased; strategic opacity diminished.
Finally, cooperation under the accord was shaped not only by bilateral commitments but also by evolving U.S. domestic legislation. Policy shifts in Washington retained the potential to affect technology transfers and fuel supplies, introducing a dimension of dependency beyond India’s direct control.
Taken together, these elements form the core of the critics’ argument: that the 2008 agreement, while transformative and diplomatically significant, embedded durable structural commitments with far-reaching implications. As India considers new trade and technology arrangements with major powers, those earlier experiences cannot be ignored.
Diplomacy is not judged solely by the applause it earns in the present, but by the flexibility it preserves for the future. Any forthcoming agreement with the United States — or any major power — must therefore be evaluated not only for immediate economic gain, but for the constraints it may quietly institutionalize for decades to come.